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Abstract
In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if
interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the
interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing
adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible
mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of
their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local
neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration
from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the
spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on
networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than
rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence
of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
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Introduction
Cooperation is a fascinating area of research since it touches
upon so many different disciplines, ranging from biology to
economics, sociology, and even theology [1]. The fact that in
human societies cooperative behavior is common among unrelated
people is puzzling from evolutionary point of view, since
cooperation can easily be exploited by selfish strategies. Evolu-
tionary game theory [2–4] provides a theoretical framework to
address the subtleties of cooperation among selfish individuals. In
particular, the prisoner’s dilemma [5,6] is a paradigm example for
studying the emergence of cooperation in spite of the fact that self-
interest seems to dictate defective behavior.
Past research has identified several key mechanisms (compre-
hensively reviewed in [7]) that promote the evolution of
cooperation. In particular, spatial reciprocity [8] has launched a
spree of activity aimed at disentangling the role of the spatial
structure by the evolution of cooperation. The seminal works in
this area focused on regular graphs and lattices [8–18]. Later
attention shifted to more complex networks [19,20], and, in
particular, to scale-free networks. Evolutionary games on graphs
and networks are thoroughly reviewed in [21]. More recent studies
have elaborated on various aspects, including the dynamical
organization [22], clustering [23] and mixing patterns [24,25], as
well as memory [26], robustness [27], phase transitions [28] and
payoff normalization [29,30].
While considering population structure is an important step for
understanding the evolution of cooperation, a crucial ingredient is
still missing. In real social networks the interaction structure is
frequently not static but evolving in concern with the behavior of
the interacting agents. As reviewed in [31] a vibrant new research
area is emerging that studies the joint evolution of interaction
structure and behavior. Many models have focused on the way
players make (or break) links in reaction to the degree of
cooperation they experienced from their interaction partners
[32–46]. Other models have considered the possibility to leave
uncooperative neighborhoods [47–54]. It is plausible that both
mechanisms can promote the evolution of cooperation, but it is
not obvious which of the two mechanisms is more efficient.
Moreover, it is not self-evident that all individuals use the same
rules for changing their interaction network in response to adverse
conditions. In fact, everyday experience tells us that different
people may react quite differently when they find themselves in a
bad neighborhood: while some tend to migrate to another
location, others tend to stay put and instead search for new
friends (or get rid of old friends) in order to improve the situation.
Motivated by such considerations, we study the joint evolution
of cooperation and interaction structure in the prisoner’s dilemma
game and in the snowdrift game. The players are of two types that
differ in the way they react to an adverse neighborhood. A fixed
fraction m of the players consists of ‘migrants’, who in proportion
to the number of defectors in their neighborhood tend to migrate
to another (unoccupied) position in the network. The comple-
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have the tendency to break their links with defectors and
subsequently to reattach the free links to other players. By
changing the parameter m, our model allows to transverse
smoothly from an adaptive linking model (m~0) to a migratory
model (m~1). In between these two extremes, we have a situation
where different players react differently when finding themselves in
an adverse neighborhood.
Results
Our analysis is based on the prisoner’s dilemma game and the
snowdrift game, two paradigm models for the evolution of
cooperation. We label the payoff parameters in line with the
conventions for the prisoner’s dilemma [5]: a cooperating player
receives the ‘‘reward’’ R in case of mutual cooperation and the
‘‘sucker’s payoff’’ S in case of being defected; a defecting player
receives the ‘‘temptation to defect’’ T when the other player
cooperates and the ‘‘punishment’’ P in case of mutual defection.
By definition, a prisoner’s dilemma game satisfies the payoff
relationships TwRwPwS. When played as a one-shot game in a
well-mixed population, defect is the only evolutionarily stable
strategy; despite of the fact that the payoff P to both players can be
considerably smaller than the payoff R for mutual cooperation.
The snowdrift game is characterized by TwR and SwP. When
played as a one-shot game in a well-mixed population, none of the
two pure strategies is evolutionarily stable and a mixed strategy is
expected to result [16]. Without loss of generality, we normalize R
and S to R~1 and S~0. In all our graphs, T is systematically
varied from 1 to 2. Hence, the game considered is a prisoner’s
dilemma game if Pw0 and a snowdrift game if Pv0.
Fig. 1 shows how for four values of the payoff parameter P the
level of cooperation evolves in relation to the temptation T to
defect and the relative frequency m of players reacting to adverse
conditions by migration. By and large, the outcome is very similar
in all four cases. Cooperation is more difficult to achieve for larger
values of T, but in general the outcome is dominated by the
parameter m. If migration is the only reaction to adverse
conditions (m~1; right-hand border of each panel), cooperation
goes extinct not only in the prisoner’s dilemma games (upper
panels in Fig. 1) but also in the snowdrift games (bottom panels in
Fig. 1). In contrast, cooperation can reach high levels or even go to
fixation if all players react to adverse conditions by rewiring
(m~0; left-hand border of each panel). Interestingly, a combina-
tion of migration and rewiring is most favorable for the evolution
of cooperation. For a broad range of m-values (0:1vmv0:6),
cooperation tends to fixation, even in case of a relatively large
temptation T to defect. Apparently, cooperation is favored if a
certain fraction of the players choose for a complete reset of their
Figure 1. Stationary density of cooperators in dependence on the fraction of players reacting to adverse conditions by migration
(m) and the payoff parameter (T). Panels (a) and (b) depict the outcome for the prisoner’s dilemma game with P~0:05 and P~0:10,
respectively, while panels (c) and (d) depict the outcome for the snowdrift game with P~{0:05 and P~{0:10, respectively. Other payoff
parameters are R~1 and S~0 in all four panels. The density of cooperators in the stationary state (after 106 iteration steps) is color-coded from blue
(full defection) to red (full cooperation), as indicated on the right of the figure. If all players are ‘‘migrants’’ (m~1; right-hand border of each panel),
defection is clearly dominant, while intermediate levels of cooperation evolve if all players are ‘‘rewirers’’ (m~0; left-hand border of each panel). In all
types of game, the highest level of cooperation evolves in mixed populations consisting of both migrants and rewirers. In this figure, the density of
occupied nodes is r~0:8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183.g001
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migration mix up the population to such an extent that local
structures providing a foothold for cooperation cannot develop.
To further analyze the mechanisms enhancing or impeding
cooperation, we performed extensive numerical simulations for the
case P~0. This is a border case that is sometimes called a ‘‘weak’’
prisoner’s dilemma game [6]. In general, the weak form of the
prisoner’s dilemma game can have other properties than the
strong form [55], but Fig. 1 clearly demonstrates that this is not the
case in our model.
Fig. 2 shows how the evolution of cooperation is affected by
population density. At low densities (r~0:4; upper panels),
cooperation does not get off the ground and at best stays at the
initial level. If the majority of the population reacts to adverse
conditions by migration, cooperation goes extinct. Similar results
were obtained when the value of r was smaller than about 0:5.I f
the population density is too small, players only have few
interaction partners, making it difficult for cooperators to form
local clusters enforcing their success.
Up to now, we have focused on the behavior of the system as a
whole. We will now zoom in a bit and study the different types of
player in more detail. The middle and right panels of Fig. 2
demonstrate that in the stationary state the strategy choice
(cooperate versus defect) of a player becomes associated with the
player’s reaction to adverse conditions. In fact, players adopting
rewiring (Fig. 2(b)(e)) show a markedly higher tendency to
cooperate than players adopting migration (Fig. 2(c)(f)). The
difference in cooperation tendency between both types of player is
smallest at low population densities (here r~0:4), where for
neither type of player the relative frequency of cooperation
exceeds 0:5. One reason for this may be that the migration of
players provides an opportunity for defectors to invade and destroy
the sparse cooperative clusters in the scattered population,
essentially creating a situation comparable to well-mixed condi-
tions. In the low-density scenario, cooperation is only sustained (at
intermediate level) when the exploitation from defectors is not too
strong. At high densities, the situation is markedly different. Even
for relatively large values of m, there is a boost of cooperation even
for large values of T. Still, players adopting migration do worse
than those adopting rewiring.
Fig. 3 shows how the reaction of a player to adverse conditions
affects the player’s degree of connectedness in the evolved
stationary population. It is obvious that the topology of a player’s
neighborhood is at least partly shaped by the player’s behavioral
choices. It has been shown that the adaptive interplay between the
players’ strategies and the underlying network can lead to the
emergence of heterogeneity from an initially homogeneous
connectivity structure [8]. As before, the difference in connectivity
between players adopting migration and players adopting rewiring
is quite small at low population density (upper panels in Fig. 3).
This difference becomes much more pronounced at high density.
For players adopting rewiring (left panels in Fig. 3), the average
degree first increases with m (to reach highest levels for m~0:6),
subsequently decreasing with a further increase of m. In contrast,
the average degree of players adopting migration only marginally
depends on m, staying close to the initial value of 4   r. For most
Figure 2. Stationary density of cooperators amongst different type of players. Panels depict results for all players (a,d), for players
adopting rewiring (b,e), and for players adopting migration (c,f), each for two different population densities [r~0:4 in (a,b,c) and r~0:8 in (d,e,f)]. As
in Fig. 1, each panel shows the outcome in dependence on the fraction of players reacting to adverse conditions by migration (m) and the payoff
parameter (T), color coded as indicated on the right of the figure. Other payoff parameters are R~1 and S~P~0 in all six panels. See main text for
further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183.g002
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degree than players adopting migration. Presumably, rewiring
leads to an accumulation of links between cooperators and thereby
the formation of tightly connected cooperative clusters.
This interpretation is corroborated by Fig. 4, which shows the
difference in connectedness between cooperating and defecting
individuals. The regions in parameter space where a high level of
cooperation evolved (Fig. 2(d)) corresponds to those regions where
cooperators are tightly connected (i.e. where cooperators have a
high degree). As before, connectedness is low in the low-density
situation (where cooperation did not get off the ground) and much
higher (at least for cooperators) in the high-density situation. For
low and intermediate values of m, the connectedness of
cooperators is markedly higher than the connectedness of
defectors. The opposite is the case a high values of m.
Finally, we consider the differences in the degree of cooperation
experienced by cooperators and defectors, respectively (Fig. 5).
Irrespective of population density and other parameters, defectors
always ended up in adverse neighborhoods. In contrast,
cooperators tended to interact only with other cooperators - at
least as long as the fraction of players adopting rewiring was not
too small (i.e. for mv0:6). For large values of m, cooperative
clusters did not emerge, corresponding to the collapse of
cooperation under these conditions.
Overall, our results confirm the importance of the formation of
cooperative clusters. If population densities are not too low and if
sufficiently many individuals adopt rewiring, cooperative clusters
can emerge even under unfavorable conditions (e.g. a large value
of T). Once clusters of cooperators have formed, selection against
defective partners can effectively shield clusters of cooperators
from the invasion of defectors. This is so because cooperators
within the cluster attract interactions with cooperators at the
cluster boundary. In this way the payoffs of cooperators both
inside the cluster and at its fringe are enhanced and interactions
with defectors are avoided. Defectors surrounding clusters of
cooperators have limited opportunities for exploitation, allowing
clusters of cooperators to expand. Thus, clusters uphold
cooperative behavior even if the temptation to defect is large.
Conversely, defectors are unable to claim lasting benefits from
occupying the clusters, simply because they become very weak as
soon as all the neighbors of the defecting cluster become defectors
themselves.
Discussion
In line with other studies, we have shown that in a network
environment cooperation in social dilemmas does readily evolve if
players have the opportunity to change their local interaction
structure when surrounded by non-cooperative neighbors. Among
the two reactions to adverse conditions considered, rewiring was
clearly more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than
migration. This was even the case in a model where the costs of
rewiring and emigration were the same (zero), while migration will
often be more costly in natural settings. Interestingly, the highest
degree of cooperation evolved when the player population was
polymorphic in the sense that both types of reaction to adverse
Figure 3. Average degree of different types of players. Panels depict results for players adopting rewiring (a,c) and for players adopting
migration (b,d), each for two different population densities [r~0:4 in (a,b) and r~0:8 in (c,d)]. The average initial degree of each occupied node
(player) was 4   r. Graphical conventions and payoff parameters are the same in Fig. 2, only that the color bar encodes the average degree in the
stationary state. See main text for further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183.g003
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negligible frequencies. We interpret this finding by the interplay of
two factors: while migration induces a certain mixing of the
population due to increased interaction ranges of the migrating
players, rewiring may lead to strongly heterogeneous interactions
networks, which are tightly associated with flushing cooperative
states [38].
In our model, the reaction to adverse conditions was assumed as
a fixed property of each player. Hence, this reaction did not
evolve. Our results suggest that the joint evolution of the strategies
in the cooperation game and the reaction to adverse condition
would lead to a polymorphism in the reaction to adverse
neighborhoods. It remains to be seen whether this is indeed the
case.
Methods
All simulations were run on a lattice of 3000 nodes with periodic
boundary. In each simulation, a fraction r of the lattice nodes was
occupied by N~r   3000 players, who initially were distributed
randomly over the lattice. Initially, each player was connected
with all players on adjacent lattice nodes. Accordingly, the initial
degree of each player ranged from 0 to 4, with an average of 4   r.
Throughout a simulation, each player had the fixed status of
either adopting migration or rewiring when confronted with
adverse conditions. This status was assigned to players at random
at the start of a simulation, with m being the fraction of migrants.
In addition, players could at each time be classified as either
cooperators or defectors in the cooperation game, but the strategy
of each player could change during a simulation due to payoff-
based learning. Initially, the strategies C and D were randomly
assigned to the players with equal probability.
To simulate evolution, we employed event-based asynchronous
updating where interactions, rewiring and migration all occurred
on the same time scale. Whenever an ‘‘event’’ occurred, a focal
player i was chosen at random. This player had pairwise
interactions with all ‘‘neighbors’’ (that is, all players connected
with i), yielding a sum Pi of all payoffs. For a randomly selected
neighbor j of i, the payoff Pj was determined in a similar way.
Based on the payoff difference Pi{Pj, the focal player switches to
j’s strategy with probability f1zexp½(Pi{Pj)=K g
{1.I fK is
large, payoff differences do not matter much for the direction of
strategy change, while such differences are decisive in case of a
small value of K. Throughout this work we set K~1, indicating
that strategies of better performing players are readily, though not
always, adopted.
Following the game interactions and the strategy change phase,
the focal player i reconsiders its interaction structure. If the focal
individual adopts rewiring, it will cut a random tie with a defecting
neighbor with probability proportional to the number of defectors;
subsequently the free link will be reattached to another player
randomly chosen from the entire population. If the focal player
adopts migration, it will migrate to a randomly chosen empty
target site with probability proportional to the number of defectors
in its neighborhood; at the new site, it will establish new links with
all players occupying adjacent sites on the network.
During a full iteration, the above process was repeated N times.
Hence on average each player was in the focal role once per
Figure 4. Average degree of players depending on their strategies. Panels depict results for cooperators (a,c) and defectors (b,d), each for
two different population densities [r~0:4 in (a,b) and r~0:8 in (c,d)]. Graphical conventions and payoff parameters are the same in Fig. 3. See main
text for further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183.g004
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pass its strategy to one of its neighbors. The process was repeated
until a stationary state was reached, where the distribution of
strategies and the characteristics of neighborhoods did not change
any more. Typically we ran each simulation for 106 steps. For each
parameter combination we ran 100 replicate simulations. The
results reported are averages over these replicates.
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